Balkans, and Russia—as part of a common Phone Number List European space.1. Both theories emphasize Russia's fundamentally European character, and neither discusses the country's peripheral position. Russia's relative to Europe seems inevitable simply because Phone Number List she has never generated her own vision of modernity, but instead adopted a European vision. From this arose a persistent dilemma that Russian intellectuals – the so-called Phone Number List intelligentsia – have suffered for the last 200 years.
According to the American historian Phone Number List Alan Pollard , “the elements that constituted their consciousness were mostly Western products. So precisely those qualities of the gave them the ability to understand – that is, what constitutes their essence – distanced this group from the reality of life in the country, which Phone Number List precisely they had to »two. Furthermore, acknowledging that Russia's modern intellectual tradition is an imitation and that the country is culturally dependent on Europe runs smack into the idea of Russian greatness. In the imagination of the Phone Number List country's ruling elites, throughout its history.
Russia has primarily formed an alternative Phone Number List center of power pursuing a global and universal 'project', like the orthodox empire of the Romanovs or the Soviet empire. Seeing Russia in a student role made the country appear as a junior partner in the concert of European power. From the Pan-Slavic view of Russia as an original "cultural-historical type" to the reinvention of the country as an autonomous world within classical , it is the Phone Number List struggle with this double dilemma that has always shaped the Russian intelligentsia 's discourses on the nation and international positioning throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Behind these exercises in symbolic geography was an aspiration shared by generations of nationalist thinkers: to Phone Number List challenge the dominant Eurocentric.